Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda #8

THE PURPOSE, CONTENT, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY PROPAGANDA; THE STRENGTH AND EFFECTS OF AN EXPOSE; AND THE NATURE OF CURRENT PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS DETERMINE WHETHER ENEMY PROPAGANDA SHOULD BE IGNORED OR REFUTED

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To Respond Or Not To Respond, That Is The Question

Goebbels felt his biggest threat was enemy propaganda. He eventually created a system to decide whether to counter-message the Allies or ignore them.

Did the Allies seem to want a reply?

Then the Nazis said nothing. Goebbels trained his staff on the latest tricks used by the Allies to help them keep discipline against petty back-and-forths with the enemy. Also, if enemy propaganda is ineffective it was better to ignore it because any answer would give it more credibility, or at the least be a waste of resources.

Goebbels reserved responses to Allied messaging only in the case of “blatant falsehoods.” see L.W. Dood’s Goebbels’ Principles of Propaganda.

In this category he included claims that Germans had bombed Vatican City, that there had been "disturbances in Berlin," that Stalin was adopting a more lenient policy toward religion, etc.

A reply was always required, however, for effective propaganda from the enemy.